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This paper analyzes seller characteristics and choices in approximately 1000 eBay 
auctions for a particular model of PDA. Seller characteristics include frequency of 
selling, reputation, and the qualities of the product sold. Seller choices include the length 
of the auction, information provided about the product, starting price, and whether to use 
a ‘Buy it Now’ option. We find that different types of sellers pursue systematically 
different strategies for how their items are offered, and we discuss the possible causes of 
these differences. For example, the two high volume sellers in our sample always use a 
combination of a ‘Buy it Now’ with a low starting price, while the many less frequent 
sellers use an array of pricing strategies. In addition, more highly rated sellers were 
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  Online sales in the United States accounted for 1.3 percent of retail transactions in 
2002, and 1.6 percent in 2003, or $54.9 billion out of over $3.4 trillion in total US retail 
sales.
1 These numbers, while still relatively small, represent substantial growth.While 
auctions have not been used for traditional, brick-and-mortar retail transactions, they are 
well suited for online buying and selling, because of the automation of the auction 
process and the consequent reduction in some kinds of transaction costs. In 2003, eBay’s 
net sales, from transaction fees on $15 billion in gross revenues, reached $1.2 billion 
(Hof, 2003), displacing mainly traditional and less structured bargaining methods, but 
also some conventional retailing. 
 
A significant element of the emergence of online auctions has been the utilization 
of auction sites such as eBay to sell products that are simultaneously sold in conventional 
retail markets. The image of online auctions has expanded beyond that of a web-based 
garage sale or swap meet, focusing on collectibles or unique items, to one where 
entrepreneurs are seeking to launch or enhance ‘e-tail’ businesses in direct competition 
with traditional retail markets. Established retailers, such as Sears Roebuck, and other 
firms that have moved into retailing, such as Walt Disney, have responded to this threat 
by selling on eBay as well, capitalizing on their existing brand names (Hof, 2003). In 
continuing to attract the largest number of online auction sellers, eBay has provided 
easily accessible tools to quickly establish and easily maintain seller ratings, based upon 
buyer feedback. Seller ratings as reputational signals, along with exposure on eBay, can 
help to level the playing field for smaller versus higher volume sellers, without much 
expense to the seller for advertising.   
 
Given the diversity of products and sellers on eBay, it is interesting to understand 
how the characteristics of sellers affect their choices of different facets of their Internet 
auctions. Examples of such choices include the length of the auction, information 
provided about the product, payment options, the starting price, and whether to use a 
private reserve price. EBay auctions also allow the seller to include the option for buyers 
to purchase immediately at a pre-specified ‘Buy it Now’ price. As explained below, this 
option allows sellers to offer a hybrid of an auction format and a posted price format, as 
well as pure versions of each market institution. We seek to understand how sellers’ 
characteristics, such as reputation and frequency of selling, affect their choices about 
pricing, payment and so on. 
 
                                                 
1 These estimates are from the US Census Bureau (reported at www.census.gov/mrts/www/current.html): 
“A stratified simple random sampling method is used to select approximately 11,000 retail firms whose 
sales are then weighted and benchmarked to represent the complete universe of over two million retail 
firms… Coverage includes all retailers whether or not they are engaged in e-commerce. Online travel 
services, financial brokers and dealers, and ticket sales agencies are not classified as retail and are not 
included in either the total retail or retail e-commerce sales estimates. Nonemployers are represented in the 
estimates through benchmarking.”  
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Our ultimate motivation is that one can view eBay and other online auctions as a 
type of ‘lab’ for studying the evolution of markets, where both larger corporations and 
individual entrepreneurs may be represented. Quantitative analyses, such as we perform 
here, are a complement to historical case studies that seek to examine similar questions. 
However, we should note that the current analysis is based on a cross-sectional ‘snapshot’ 
of the sales environment within a single e-business, eBay. We would expect infrequent 
and inexperienced sellers to try many different strategies when they use eBay, and we 
cannot necessarily identify which strategies will be most successful in the long run. Our 
indirect evidence comes from contrasting this diversity with the approach followed by the 
highest volume sellers in our sample.   
 
Our sample includes two sellers who we can easily classify as ‘retailers.’  We pay 
special attention to their characteristics, and to the choices that they make concerning the 
conduct of their auctions in order to compare their selling strategies with those of the 
other sellers in the sample.  We are particularly interested in whether these high-volume 
sellers function as ‘leaders’ in this eBay marketplace by exhibiting successful strategies, 
which might be identified and copied by the lower volume sellers in our sample.  In more 
traditional retail markets, we would expect this type of convergence in the fairly mature 
market for the Palm Pilot Vx, which we examine.  However, if increased accessibility for 
sellers is still the primary calling card of eBay then our sample is likely to have been 
collected during an ongoing “churning” of the market, with sellers entering and exiting 
all the time.  
 
In fact, we see much greater heterogeneity of strategies amongst lower volume 
sellers. This may reflect inherent differences in optimal strategies between high volume 
and low volume sales.  Another, evolutionary explanation of the diversity in sales 
strategies amongst lower volume sellers may be evident from our result that selling less 
frequently in our sample is highly correlated with less experience in selling on eBay in 
general.  In such a case, most of the sellers that we have caught in our cross-sectional 
“snapshot” may still be in a process of experimentation with the many selling-strategy 
choices that eBay offers to its potential sellers. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews some of the most 
relevant literature on Internet auctions, as well as some other evidence on Internet 
markets. Section 3 summarizes the data, obtained from about one thousand eBay auctions 
over a period of five weeks for a particular brand of handheld computer. Section 4 
examines the relationships between observable characteristics of products and sellers.  
For example, we find that selling frequency and measured seller reputation in this market 
can be correlated with whether the products are damaged or new.  Section 5 presents 
results on the relationship between sellers’ characteristics and their choices with respect 
to the format of the auction.  We find that the wide variety of sellers’ characteristics 
represented on eBay is accompanied by a widely varying set of seller strategies, where 
the patterns in these strategies are very difficult to identify.  In spite of this difficulty, the 
volume of sales by the seller, which can be interpreted as their ‘experience’ in eBay 
auctions, is a primary determinant of recognizable patterns, particularly for ‘retailers.’ 
Section 6 discusses differences in auctions that resulted in a sale versus those that did not.  
The main conclusions of this section are that auctions ending in a sale were much less 
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likely to involve a private reserve price, much less likely to be conducted by high volume 
sellers, and somewhat more likely to use the ‘Buy it Now’ option.  Section 7 concludes 




2. Research on Internet Auctions 
  
There is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, on auctions, but little of 
it relates product and seller characteristics to seller choices regarding the format of the 
auction.  In addition, while online auctions and their characteristics have received a lot of 
attention since their rapid emergence in the last decade, the more recent move toward 
hybridization of online auctions that introduces elements of the posted price institution 
has not.  
 
Within the theoretical auction literature perhaps the most relevant to the current 
issue of seller choice is that of optimal auction design.  Such work addresses connections 
between auction structure, efficiency, and value maximization.  For instance, Riley and 
Samuelson (1981) evaluates the appropriate choice of minimum bid or reserve price for 
maximization of seller revenue given an environment of private bidder values.  The 
optimal minimum bid maximizes revenue but introduces the possibility of failure to sell 
the item.  The issue of auction design in an environment with many sellers is explored by 
Peters and Severinov (2002).  The authors identify equilibrium seller behavior regarding 
auction structure and reserve prices.  They verify the result of McAfee and Vincent 
(1993) that sellers set a reserve price equal to cost in equilibrium.  Their primary focus, 
however, is on bidder response to such design and the resulting efficiency properties.  
Their environment incorporates neither heterogeneity in seller and product characteristics 
nor the potential to offer a posted price. 
 
Empirical studies of the conduct of online auctions address a wide range of issues. 
Pioneering work by David Lucking-Reiley (1999) focuses on testing classical results 
from auction theory, such as revenue equivalence. Using data from online field 
experiments, Reiley rejects revenue-equivalence of Dutch and second-price sealed bid 
auctions but finds no such evidence for first-price sealed bid and English auctions. In 
another field experiment, Katkar and Lucking-Reiley (2000), comparing public and 
private reserve prices, show that the use of a private reserve reduces both the probability 
of a sale and the transaction price.
2  Resnick et al (2003) find that the effects of seller 
reputation, often unclear in field data, have the predicted positive impact on seller 
revenues when proper experimental controls are imposed.   
 
Our work belongs to an alternative approach, which collects and analyzes 
transactions data from Internet sites. Using this method, Morgan and Baye (2001) analyze 
persistent price dispersion in posted price markets on the Internet. Also, Houser and 
                                                 
2 One caveat to these results is that the authors found some informal evidence that sellers were using the 
private reserve to circumvent eBay's fee structure by contacting high bidders on the side in unsuccessful 
auctions. 
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Wooders (2000) examine the effect of bidder and seller reputation on auction outcomes, 
concluding that seller reputations are correlated with auction success in Pentium III 
microprocessor auctions on eBay. Roth and Ockenfels (2002) study the timing of bids, 
and the impact of different methods of specifying auction deadlines. Comparing eBay 
and Amazon auctions, they find evidence that auctions held with a ’soft’ ending time 
where the length of the auction is extended when a late bid arrives discourage such late 
bidding, or ’sniping’ common on eBay. They further propose that, given eBay’s auction 
format, late bidding may be rational strategic agents.
3 Lucking-Reiley et al. (2000) use 
data collected from eBay auctions of one-cent coins to study determinants of price. They 
find evidence that seller feedback ratings have a significant impact on prices, that 
minimum bids and private reserve prices raise the auction price, and that the length of an 
auction has a significant and positive effect on price in these auctions. 
 
In a companion piece of research to this paper, Anderson et al. (2004) examine a 
sub-sample of the eBay auctions considered in this paper, and use regression analysis to 
analyze auction outcomes. For example they find that less experienced sellers received 
lower prices, on average, unless they effectively posted a price, but seller reputation, as 
measured by eBay’s feedback ratings, did not significantly affect the final price.  Milam 
(2002) also examines the issue of posted prices versus auctions, contrasting the working 
of eBay and Yahoo auctions in this respect. A major difference is that Yahoo allows a 
‘Buy it Now’ price to be available even after bidding starts, and this greater flexibility 
leads to the option being used by a greater proportion of Yahoo sellers, with more 
auctions also ending with a buyer accepting the ‘Buy it Now’ price. 
 
A third empirical approach has been to use laboratory experiments to examine the 
impact of different auction rules. For example, Ariely, Ockenfels and Roth (2003) further 
examine the issue of ending rules. The experimental design allows the authors to isolate 
the importance of ending rules in explaining patterns of late bidding, without the other 




3. Data Overview 
  
Seller behavior on an online auction site is best examined with a reasonably large 
sample of auctions involving a homogeneous good, and over a short period of time. 
Therefore we chose to gather data for one of the highest volume (at the time – August 
2001) and most homogenous items, the Palm Vx handheld computer.  The data was taken 
from eBay, the largest Internet auction site, using a web-crawling ‘spider’ program. 
 
EBay Auction Rules 
We begin with a review of eBay’s basic rules before presenting the data. The 
seller provides information on the item, such as a description and picture, terms of 
payment and shipping, and chooses the duration of the auction, either 3, 5, 7, or 10 days.  
                                                 
3 See also Bajari and Hortaçsu (2003) and Ockenfels and Roth (2003) on this and related issues. 
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The seller also chooses a minimum first bid, or starting price, and whether to enter a 
private reserve price. Potential buyers know when a private reserve price exists but do not 
know its value until someone bids above it. Sellers may also provide links to their own 
“home pages” on the web, which can be a source of further information for buyers. 
 
Potential buyers can bid on any item they find on eBay’s web site, and bid 
histories are available to them. The auction ends at the pre-specified time, and the item 
goes to the highest bidder at the highest bid price. Details of shipping and payment are 
left up to the buyer and seller, although eBay provides services on these aspects of the 
transaction, at an additional fee. Finally, eBay also provides a record of comments about 
sellers, so that sellers have the potential to develop and maintain reputations. Potential 
buyers have access to these comments, as well as all seller-provided information.  
 
The seller also can specify a ‘Buy it Now’ price, whereby s/he commits to sell the 
item immediately to any buyer who accepts that specified price, thus ending the auction 
early.  The ‘Buy it Now’ option is extinguished (and disappears from the item’s auction 
site) when any buyer enters a bid that is at least as great as the minimum first bid, even if 
the first bid is lower than the ‘Buy it Now’ price. The seller can prevent this from 
happening by specifying a starting price (or a private reserve price) at or above the ‘Buy 
it Now’ price. Such price combinations are equivalent to a posted price, since bidding is 
rendered irrelevant. A scan of buyer comments on eBay suggested that they find the 
practice of using a high private reserve price annoying and they may avoid the auction. 
Using a high starting price is just as effective and more transparent.  Used by itself, the 
‘Buy it Now’ option creates a hybrid institution, a mix of an auction and a posted price, 




We collected data on 1211 Palm Vx auctions on eBay from August 6 to 
September 11, 2001 using a web-crawling ‘spider’ similar to that described in Lucking-
Reiley et al (2000). Of these auctions, 1031 resulted in a sale, but in 23 cases we could 
not determine whether or not the auction started with a ‘Buy it Now’ option, and we 
eliminated these from consideration. Therefore, the main analysis (Sections 4 and 5) 
focuses on 1008 successful auctions for which we have complete data. Section 6 provides 
an analysis of the differences between auctions that resulted in a sale and those that did 
not, and examines a total of 1177 auctions. Table 1 lists the variables used in the analysis, 
including some that describe the outcomes of the auctions. 
 
Table 2 presents the average values of the variables for the 1008 successful 
auctions with complete data. The first column reports on the full sample of completed 
transactions, the second and third report the subsamples for which the seller did not or did 
use the ‘Buy it Now’ option, and the last two divide the previous subsample according to 
whether the ‘Buy it Now’ option was exercised.  The sample sizes appear in the bottom 
row.  
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Equal to one, if the item is definitively described to be “sealed, in the box, and new” in either the title of the 
auction listing or in the description text (zero otherwise) 
DAMAGE  Equal to one, if any significant damage to the item is mentioned in either the title or the description text. 
EXTRAS 
Equal to one, if the item is being offered with significant accessories, mentioned in either the title or the 
description text. 
QUANTITY  Number of items sold in a single, particular auction. 
DAYS806  Number of days between the start of the auction and the date of the first auction in the sample (8/6/01). 
SINGLSR  Equal to one, if the seller only held one auction during our sample. 
MULTSLR  Equal to one, if the seller held more than one auction but no more than ten auctions during our sample. 
FREQSLR  Equal to one, if the seller held more than ten auctions but no more than fifty auctions during our sample. 
RETAILER  Equal to one, if the seller held more than fifty auctions during our sample. 
LNSLRTNG 
Natural logarithm of the difference between the number of unique, positive comments about the seller and the 
number of unique, negative comments. 
NEGRATIO 
Ratio of the number of unique, negative comments to the total number of unique comments listed in the 
seller's feedback page. 
SLRHOME  Equal to one, if the seller posts a link to his website in the description text of the auction listing. 
STARTPRC  Initial price to start the bidding, posted by the seller at the beginning of the auction. 
SQRSTPRC  Square of the seller’s starting price. 
LOWSTPRC    Equal to one, if the seller posts an initial price below twenty dollars. 
POSTDPRC  Equal to one, if the seller sets the initial price equal to a displayed, ‘Buy it Now’ price. 
STRTBYNW 
Equal to one, if the seller offers buyers the option to buy the item immediately at a displayed, ‘Buy it Now’ 
price. 
BYNOWPRC  Seller's price if displayed at the beginning of the auction as a ‘Buy it Now’ offer. 
PRIVTRES 
Equal to one, if the seller displays a notice that actual sale is subject to a buyer at least bidding as high as some 
unknown, private, reserve price. 
FEATURED 
Equal to one, if the seller paid extra to have the item(s) listed at the top of the listings, no matter what the 
potential buyer's search criteria was. 
DSCLNGTH 
Number of text characters in the description of the item, composed by the seller for the auction listing page, 
minus the number of HTML tags. 
IMAGE  Equal to one, if the seller included at least one image in the description of the item. 
SCRPYDUM  Equal to one, if the seller accepts credit cards, PayPal, or eBay Online Payments. 
DURATION  Duration of the auction, initially set by the seller to a maximum of 3, 5, 7, or 10 days. 
ENDBYNOW  Equal to one, if the auction ends with a buyer accepting a seller's ‘Buy it Now’ option. 
NUMBIDS  Number of bids on the item(s) in a particular auction. 
UNIQBIDR  Number of unique bidders for the item(s) in a particular auction. 
WINBID  Dollar value of the final bid in an auction that resulted in a sale. 
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Table 2: Sample and Sub-sample Means 
 
Variable All  Sales 
 “Buy it Now” 
not Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
Offered 
“Buy it Now” 
not Accepted 
“Buy it Now” 
Accepted 
Product Characteristics 
NEW  0.283 0.368 0.187 0.157 0.312 
DAMAGE  0.019 0.023 0.015 0.005 0.054 
EXTRAS  0.316 0.400 0.223 0.168 0.452 
QUANTITY  1.793 2.480 1.021 1.026  1 
DAYS806 18 18 17 17 18 
Seller Characteristics 
SINGLSLR 0.316 0.445 0.173 0.131 0.344 
MULTSLR 0.216 0.270 0.156 0.089 0.430 
FREQSLR  0.208 0.285 0.122 0.099 0.215 
RETAILER 0.259  0  0.549 0.681 0.011 
NEGRATIO  0.019 0.030 0.007 0.005 0.017 
LNSLRTNG  4.132 3.313 5.052 5.155 4.627 
Seller Choices 
SLRHOME 0.210 0.141 0.288 0.309 0.204 
STARTPRC $62.56 $63.91 $61.05 $26.20  $204.20 
LOWSTPRC 0.541  0.435 0.659 0.819  0 
PRIVTRES 0.183 0.225 0.135 0.086 0.333 
FEATURED  0.020  0.038  0 0 0 
DSCLNGTH 9618  4485  15378  18126  4090 
IMAGE  0.794 0.675 0.926 0.953 0.817 
SCRPYDUM  0.800 0.705 0.905 0.937 0.774 
POSTDPRC  0.090    0.192 0.003 0.968 
STRTBYNW  0.471    1 1 1 
BYNOWPRC  $224.34    $224.34 $229.03 $205.08 
Auction Outcomes 
DURATION  5.030 5.164 4.880 5.516 2.269 
ENDBYNOW 0.101    0.196  0  1 
NUMBIDS  17.299 18.317 16.156 19.500  2.419 
UNIQBIDR 9.771 10.424 9.038 10.804 1.785 
WINBID  $200.83 $197.94 $204.07 $204.04 $204.20 
Sample  Size  1008  533 475 382  93 
 
 
The observable product characteristics — whether the item is new, whether it is 
damaged or includes any extra accessories — are coded as dummy variables, with our 
categorization of the characteristic being present relying on a definitive indication in the 
accompanying product description. The Quantity variable refers to the number of units 
offered in a particular auction; the mode is always one, since single item sales are by far 
the most common, and large quantities are quite rare when ‘Buy it Now’ was offered.
4 
DAYS806 is the time trend; auctions starting later would tend to yield lower prices due to 
economic obsolescence. The means in row one of the table indicate that the ‘Buy it Now’ 
                                                 
4  Only two sellers sold significantly large quantities per auction.  In looking at seller choices, their 
strategies were basically the same.  They did not use ‘Buy it Now’ or a private reserve price but they did set 
their starting prices very high.   
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option is less likely to be offered but more likely to be accepted on new items, which 
constitute 28.3% of the sample. 
 
The data in Table 2 are organized according to four categories. The first set of 
variables cover the characteristics of the good, as observed or inferred from the web site 
data. The PERL script in the ‘spider’ program used to gather this data had to focus on 
certain key words and qualifiers in the title and text describing the item, in order to 
determine these good characteristics without actually viewing a picture of the item for 
sale, as a bidder typically would.  Since the sellers, who write these titles and 
descriptions, are likely to shade the truth as much in their favor as possible, our 
specifications for the script search had to be very strict.   
 
As a result, the proportions of damaged items are probably understated, due to the 
reluctance of sellers to mention any damage, but the proportions of new items could also 
be understated, since many items that were labeled as “new” but not factory “sealed” in 
the original box could not be deemed as strictly “new”.  Also, there are many possible 
extras or accessories for the Palm Pilot Vx but some of them are essential to its function, 
such as the stylus and the recharging base or cradle.  Many sellers mentioned these 
standard components, which are included with the basic Palm Vx, as “extras.”  Therefore, 
we counted such items as extras. However, the estimated proportions only slightly 
overstate the prevalence of extras, because a scan through the actual auction pages 
indicated that, almost always, when these standard accessories were present, so were true 
extra accessories. 
 
Observable seller characteristics (unfortunately) cannot include risk aversion or 
time preference, but they do include the number of auctions conducted during the sample 
period — MULTSLR codes 2-10 auctions, FREQSLR codes 11-50, and RETAILER 
codes over 50) — as well as buyer ratings. The two retailers in our sample accounted for 
more than half of the ‘Buy it Now’ offers but only 1% of those offers accepted by 
buyers.
5   
 
Ratings are long strings of comments, which we summarize in two variables: 
NEGRATIO is the ratio of negative to total comments, and LNSLRTNG is the natural 
log of positive comments net of negative comments.
6  Thus lower NEGRATIO and 
                                                 
5 Two more sellers in our sample could not be clearly classified as retailers, although they also sold a large 
quantity of Palm Pilot Vx’s during our sample period by offering large quantities (25 to 45 items) for sale 
in the same auction.  Such auctions are termed “Dutch Auctions” on eBay and usually result in the seller 
receiving a lower price in order to move a larger quantity of items more quickly.  We define “retailers” to 
exclude such sellers, whose choices might consistently be affected by extraordinary time constraints. 
6 Even if old, possibly irrelevant, negative comments on a seller do matter to a potential buyer, one should 
expect them to eventually be swamped by mostly positive feedback if the seller continues to be able to sell 
on eBay.  That is, for an experienced eBay seller/buyer even grievous mistakes of the past are not likely to 
be reflected in the seller’s rating, nor easily discovered by the potential buyer, although the negative 
feedback remains on the sellers permanent record.  Thus, since there is not much fluctuation in the raw 
number of negative comments amongst sellers and the number of negative comments is relatively low, we 
use the ratio of negative comments to the total number of comments.  This variable behaves much like the 
seller rating, except in the opposite direction, decreasing steadily as the frequency of selling for a particular 
seller increases.   
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higher LNSLRTNG indicate two aspects of better seller reputation. These ratings are 
better on average in the ‘Buy it Now’ subsamples.  
 
Seller choices are summarized in the next section of the table. Overall 21% 
display links to homepages. Minimum bid prices average about $60, but diverge for 
accepted and not accepted “Buy it Now,” probably reflecting the fact that this option is 
accepted more often when it is effectively a posted price (POSTDPRC = 1). Private 
reserve prices are used in 18.3% of all auctions, and more frequently when a ‘Buy it 
Now’ price is accepted. Sellers offer secure payment procedures (SCRPYDUM = 1) and a 
picture of the product (IMAGE = 1) in about 80% of auctions, but rarely pay for a place 
in eBay’s featured items (FEATURED = 1). Description lengths average about 10,000 
characters but are, for no obvious reason, longer in auctions where the option is not 
accepted.  Some 47.1% of auctions in our sample offer the ‘Buy it Now’ option; of these 
19.2% actually are posted price.  
 
Before our sample period, eBay established a popular, alternative web site, called 
Half.com, for individuals who wished to buy and sell most of the same items that are 
available on eBay, including Palm Pilots, at posted prices.  The low numbers of sellers 
posting a price in our sample may indicate that sellers interested in posting a price, 
preferred such an alternative posted price site, rather than try to “fool” the bidders who 
were visiting eBay looking for more of an actual auction.  We also noted by informal 
inspection of the eBay auction pages from our sample that eBay allowed sellers to post 
links to their storefronts at Half.com in order to sell the same item at a posted price.  
 
The last part of the table contains data on the auction outcomes, including average 
duration (about 5 days except when the ‘Buy it Now’ option is accepted), the number of 
bids, number of unique bidders, and the winning bid. Winning bids averaged about $200 
and tended to be about $6 higher for sellers offering the ‘Buy it Now’ option, whether or 
not it was accepted. 
 
 
4. Product and Seller Characteristics 
 
In Table 3, we present correlation matrices for three sub-samples, focusing on the 
correlations between product and seller characteristics.  We observe generally low 
correlations between different product characteristics, with expected negative signs on 
correlations between such characteristics as “new” and “damaged”. Negative signs on 
correlations between the dummy variable for a new item, based upon the seller’s 
description, and whether any extras are mentioned by the seller in advertising the item are 
also intuitive in the sense that it should be clear to the seller, with the definition that we 
have used to categorize “new”, that a new item must necessarily be accompanied by what 
sellers of used items often term as “extras”. 
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Table 3: Correlations Between Product and Seller Characteristics 
 
 
Non–‘Buy it Now’ Sub-sample (533 Observations) 
Variable  NEW DAMG. EXTS. QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET. NEGS. LRTNG
NEW 1  -0.06  -0.23  -0.02  0.02  -0.29  -0.02  0.34  0  0.27  0.08 
DAMAGE   1  -0.05  -0.04  0.06  0.09  -0.01  -0.10  0  -0.06  0.04 
EXTRAS      1  -0.12 0.02  0.36  0.04 -0.43  0  -0.21 -0.14 
QUANTITY       1  0.09 -0.23  -0.01  0.27 0 0.01 0.27 
DAYS806         1  0.01  0.08  -0.09  0  0.04  -0.06 
SINGLSLR        1  -0.54  -0.57  0  -0.22  -0.33 
MULTSLR         1  -0.38  0  -0.06  0.04 
FREQSLR           1  0  0.31  0.32 
RETAILER            0  0  0 
NEGRATIO              1  0.04 
LNSLRTNG               1 
                 
“Buy it Now” not Accepted Sub-sample (382 Observations) 
Variable NEW  DAMG.  EXTS.  QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET.  NEGS.  LRTNG
NEW  1  -0.03 0.27 0.10 0.02  0.15  0.27 0.55  -0.63  0.17 -0.23 
DAMAGE    1  0.16 -0.01 0.04  0.08  0.10 -0.02  -0.11  -0.02 -0.15 
EXTRAS     1  -0.05  0.01  0.41  0.18  0.39  -0.65  0.22  -0.41 
QUANTITY       1  -0.04 -0.04 0.32  -0.03  -0.15  0.12 -0.10 
DAYS806         1 0.01  -0.05  0.12  -0.06  -0.07  -0.14 
SINGLSLR           1  -0.12  -0.13  -0.57  0.14  -0.36 
MULTSLR             1 -0.10  -0.46  0.40  -0.35 
FREQSLR               1  -0.49  0.07  -0.14 
RETAILER             1  -0.38  0.56 
NEGRATIO               1  -0.20 
LNSLRTNG                1 
                  
“Buy it Now”–Accepted Sub-sample (93 Observations) 
Variable NEW  DAMG.  EXTS.  QUNT. DAYS. SINGL. MULT. FREQ. RET.  NEGS.  LRTNG 
NEW 1  -0.16  -0.10  0  0.02  -0.19  -0.30  0.61  -0.07  -0.02  0.37 
DAMAGE    1  -0.12  0  0.12 0.03 0.08  -0.12  -0.02  0.45 -0.12 
EXTRAS      1  0  -0.06 0.02 -0.18 0.21  -0.09  -0.19 -0.10 
QUANTITY       0 0 0 0 0  0  0 0 
DAYS806         1  -0.07  0.02  0.07  -0.02  -0.02  0.05 
SINGLSLR        1  -0.63  -0.38  -0.08  -0.20  -0.42 
MULTSLR         1  -0.45  -0.09  0.19  -0.11 
FREQSLR           1  -0.05  0.02  0.59 
RETAILER            1  -0.05  0.12 
NEGRATIO              1  -0.15 
L N S L R T N G                1  
 
 
Some of the correlations between product and seller characteristics are notable.  
For example, whether an item is new is positively correlated with the seller holding 11-50 
auctions during the sample period, while this is not the case for other frequencies of 
selling.  Also in the ‘Buy it Now’-accepted sub-sample, sales of damaged items are 
positively correlated with NEGRATIO.  This is the strongest correlation of the damage 
variable with any of the other variables in the table.  Since all but one seller in this sub-
sample posted a price, this correlation appears to indicate that posting a price is a popular 
seller strategy when trying to overcome a history of negative feedback related to dealing 
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in damaged goods.  Finally, note the positive correlations between whether an item is 
new and a seller’s rating. This is consistent with an underlying causality that sellers of 
clearly new items are less likely to encounter negative feedback, because the product 
characteristics are less uncertain. Of course, negative ratings could also be based on other 
aspects of the transaction, such as timeliness of delivery.  
 
The reputational aspects of the seller are obviously of considerable interest, since 
one of the issues in Internet selling has been how to judge the quality of the seller in the 
absence of familiar visual signals (storefront, location, and so on). EBay makes it fairly 
simple for sellers to effectively bury negative comments on the seller’s ratings page.  
Additionally, this breakdown of the seller’s rating is not immediately observable by a 
potential buyer at first glance of the seller’s eBay auction page.  Since past comments 
concerning the individual as either a buyer or a seller, both positive and negative, never 
disappear from a seller’s ratings, we should generally expect seller ratings to improve 
with more frequent selling or buying on eBay and NEGRATIO to eventually approach 
zero.  Furthermore, unlike with person-to-person consumer information sharing or “word 
on the street” regarding bricks and mortar sellers, if you do not actually purchase an item 
from a particular seller none of your feedback concerning that seller will be posted for 
future potential buyers to see.   
 
An exception to the expectation that selling frequency and rating are positively 
correlated is the coincidence of a large number of negative comments with sellers who 
repeatedly sell very “well used” or damaged goods on eBay.  Also, less experienced 
‘multiple’ sellers (those who held less than 10 auctions in our sample), may be still 
experimenting with advertising and delivery methods of this particular item.  Within this 
category there are positive correlations between the ratio of negative comments and being 
a multiple seller for both ‘Buy it Now’ sub-samples. 
 
Table 3 does show that the ratio of negative comments is positively correlated 
with being a frequent seller in the sub-sample where no ‘Buy it Now’ option was made 
available, although it is negatively correlated in the sub-sample where the ‘Buy it Now’ 
option was not accepted and has almost zero correlation in the ‘Buy it Now’-accepted 
sub-sample.  Among sellers that do not make a ‘Buy it Now’ option available, frequent 
sellers may be at an “in-between” level of experience, where the negative comments in 
their feedback pages have more than kept up with any positive feedback, while they have 
been experimenting with various selling strategies.  We do see the expected correlations 
with feedback for the sellers who make the ‘Buy it Now’ option available but do not post 




5. Seller Characteristics and Choices 
 
In examining our sample data for evidence of “retailers” functioning as “market 
leaders” on eBay, we do not observe this leadership role with respect to the seller 
strategies that we can identify. The two retailers in our sample uniformly adopt a strategy 
of: a ‘Buy it Now’ price, no posted price, a low starting price, and no private reserve.  As 
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we will more carefully describe in this section, the strategies of the less frequent sellers in 
our sample differ widely from the choices of retailers.   
 
First, we examine the relationship between seller reputations and seller choices 
and auction conduct.  We are interested in whether sellers with different ratings have 
different behavior, and whether the resulting auctions are different.  We have already 
noted the positive correlation between a seller’s reputation and the volume of auctions 
conducted during our sample.  We also noted that a possible reason for finding such weak 
correlations between negative feedback on sellers and their ability to sell on eBay is the 
way that eBay relegates this negative information to another page.  Therefore, we begin 
this section with a look at the correlation of these two reputation variables with seller 
choices, auction conduct, and auction outcomes, as shown in Table 4.  
 
In general, the seller’s rating should be positively correlated with the seller 
choosing to more accurately represent the quality of the item, be more transparent about 
what price will be accepted (no private reserve prices), and prompt delivery in the past.  
With more eBay experience, a seller has had greater opportunities to record more 
successes along these lines than failures, so the ratio of negative comments to positive 
should decrease with the number of sales.  However, negative comments should have 
more of an effect when they are more noticeable (fewer overall comments), such as when 
a seller is less experienced on eBay.  Unfortunately, we still may not be able to notice this 
negative correlation in our sub-samples because it may have prevented previous sales, in 
which case there is no record in the seller’s feedback.   
 
Correlations with Seller Reputations 
The correlations in Table 4 indicate that when buyers are not confronted with a 
high public reserve price and have more leeway and time to bid on the item, they do not 
inflict negative comments upon the seller.  This is reflected in the negative correlations of 
the ratio of negative comments with a low starting price and with auction duration, for 
our sample as a whole.  At least buyers do not appear to be laying blame on the seller for 
the outcomes of auctions when the bidding process is less restricted.  Note that, in 
general, the ratio of negative comments to total comments concerning the sellers’ past 
dealings on eBay is not strongly correlated with most of the other seller choices or 
auction outcomes, when one considers all sales in our sample. 
 
Still, correlations of negative comments with seller choices and outcomes appear 
to be much stronger for the auctions that started with a ‘Buy it Now’ offer.  In particular, 
attempts to protect a price appear to be more common for sellers with proportionally 
more negative comments, on average, for this sub-sample.  Using “Buy it Now” to 
effectively post a price or imposing a higher starting price to start the bidding (even if it 
is not equal to the ‘Buy it Now’ price) have notable, positive correlation coefficients with 
the ratio of negative comments.  Also, note that the correlation between seller reputation 
and auctions ending with the ‘Buy it Now’ option being accepted are almost identical to 
the correlation between posting a price and seller reputation because only one ‘Buy it 
Now’ offer that was not also a posted price was actually accepted in our sample.   
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Sellers who started their auctions with “Buy it Now” and have a higher ratio of 
negative feedback, it appears from Table 4, tend to set lower ‘Buy it Now’ prices and 
provide less information about the item, either via a longer description or by posting a 
photograph of the item.  This combination might indicate these sellers attempting to sell 
quickly to impatient eBay “deal seekers”, who may snap up the item at a discounted ‘Buy 
it Now’ price without doing the extra work of delving through these sellers’ ratings pages 
to discover the higher prevalence negative comments, relative to other sellers.  Finally, 
note that the auction outcomes are negatively correlated with the ratio of negative 
comments for the sellers in this ‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample.  Duration, number of bids, 
number of bidders, and the dollar value of the final price are all negatively correlated 
with negative feedback on these sellers, although these same correlations were not 
notable for the sample as a whole. 
 
 




 All  Sales 
No  
“Buy it Now” 
Only  
“Buy it Now” 
“Buy it Now” 
not Accepted 
“Buy it Now” 
Accepted 
Variable NEGS.  RTNG  NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG NEGS. RTNG  NEGS.  RTNG
Seller Choices            
SLRHOME  -0.03 0.45 -0.00 0.40 0.09 0.48 0.03 0.59 0.32  0.13 
STARTPRC  0.06 -0.17 0.00 -0.09 0.24 -0.29 0.26 -0.38 -0.36 0.06 
LOWSTPRC  -0.27 0.32 -0.24 0.17 -0.33 0.38 -0.34 0.46  0  0 
POSTDPRC  -0.01 0.08      0.26 -0.16 0.09 -0.01 0.06 -0.09 
STRTBYNW -0.24  0.46          
BYNOWPRC       -0.34  -0.19  -0.24  -0.37  -0.37  0.05 
PRIVTRES  0.02 -0.27 -0.03 -0.19 0.09 -0.34 0.16 -0.41 -0.12 -0.16 
FEATURED  -0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.15  0  0  0  0  0  0 
DSCLNGTH  -0.05 0.57 0.38 0.31 -0.22 0.65 -0.21 0.78 0.03  0.21 
IMAGE  0.00 0.42 0.11 0.35 -0.06 0.30 -0.14 0.30 0.11 0.25 
SCRPYDUM  -0.01 0.29 0.08 0.19 -0.10 0.25 -0.20 0.21 0.122 0.25 
Auction Outcomes            
ENDBYNOW  -0.02  0.08     0.25  -0.15      
DURATION  -0.18 -0.08 -0.27 0.00 -0.18 -0.14 -0.08 -0.34 -0.11  0.12 
NUMBIDS  -0.04 0.11 -0.02 0.15 -0.26 0.20 -0.20 0.15 -0.04 0.10 
UNIQBIDR  -0.04 0.12 -0.02 0.17 -0.32 0.21 -0.30 0.18 -0.06 0.11 
WINBID  -0.07 -0.04 -0.00 -0.08 -0.23 -0.12 -0.14 -0.22 -0.36  0.06 
Sample Size  1008 533  475  382  93 
 
 
Moving from analyzing the ratio of negative comments to the logarithm of the 
sellers’ net ratings, correlation coefficients in Table 4 suggest that both providing more 
information about himself, through posting a link or links to a personal web-page, and 
providing more information about the good, through posting a photograph and increasing 
the length of the product description, are choices that increase with an improved seller 
rating.  These strong, positive correlations hold for the sample as a whole and not just the 
‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample, unlike with the prevalence of negative comments.  Still, in 
sum, Table 4 provides strong evidence that sellers with better reputations provide more 
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information concerning themselves and their product than sellers with less favorable 
reputations on eBay.  
 
The correlations in Table 4 also indicate that trying to protect a price, through 
either requiring a private reserve price to be met by the eventual buyer or by simply 
setting a higher starting price, was not as common for sellers with better seller ratings.  
Again, this can be seen in the sample as a whole – unlike the increased prevalence of 
protecting a price amongst sellers with proportionally more negative comments, which 
we could really only detect amongst sellers in the ‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample.  For the 
same result with respect to posting a price, we still have to look at the ‘Buy it Now’ sub-
sample and it yields the same result of better reputations being negatively correlated with 
this strategy of completely protecting a price. 
 
It is important to keep in mind that merely starting the auction with a ‘Buy it 
Now’ offer is not really protecting a price and, if not accompanied by a private reserve, a 
high starting price, or being part of the strategy of posting a price is more a form of price 
discrimination between more or less patient buyers.  This price discrimination strategy is 
strongly and positively correlated with sellers’ net seller ratings, on average, for the 
sample as whole.   
 
Auction outcomes are only weakly correlated with sellers’ net seller ratings for 
the sample as a whole, although it does appear from Table 4 that better reputations 
attracted more bids and bidders, on average.  This realization is in spite of the appearance 
of negative correlations between the sellers’ reputations and the duration of the auctions, 
especially in the ‘Buy it Now’ sub-sample.   
 
Finally, it does not appear as if sellers with better seller ratings were able to 
consistently or effectively leverage that reputation into better sales prices for their 
product, relative to less reputable sellers.  For the sample as a whole and for the non-‘Buy 
it Now’ sub-sample this is simply reflected by slightly negative correlations that are not 
very distinguishable from zero between seller ratings and final prices.  For the ‘Buy it 
Now’ sub-sample, this negative correlation is more notable, possibly indicating that 
starting an auction with “Buy it Now” reduces even further the ability of more reputable 
sellers to parlay this into higher sales prices.  It should be reiterated that the ratio of 
negative comments is even more strongly, negatively correlated to the final price, than 
the log of net seller ratings but this appears to be primarily due to the strategies of sellers 
that posted a price (about 98%) of the ‘Buy it Now’ accepted sub-sample. 
 
Comparisons among Different Selling Frequencies 
As noted in the introduction, using ‘Buy it Now’ without trying to further protect 
a price or otherwise restrict the conduct of the auction is indicative of the strategy 
employed by the two retailers in our sample.  Simultaneously, because feedback 
comments do not disappear on eBay, a seller’s reputation as measured by the seller’s net 
seller rating is strongly and positively correlated with selling frequency.  Therefore, we 
would like to examine more carefully the choice of starting an auction with a ‘Buy it 
Now” offer, other seller choices, characteristics of products, conduct and outcomes of the 
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auctions, and characteristics of the sellers (like reputation) more closely between groups 
of sellers, as categorized by selling frequency.   
 
Our primary interest in analyzing the following plots of mean values of these 
different eBay auction characteristics in our sample, according to the different selling 
frequencies, is an attempt to identify whether the strategies of our two more experienced 
sellers (retailers) are dominant and offer some insight as to why or why not.  Secondarily, 
this analysis also allows more insight into the correlations that we have just examined in 
the first part of this section. 
 
The first figure clearly demonstrates how a seller’s net rating (reputation) 
increases with increased frequency of selling (experience) in our sample, on average.  
Since previous comments on the seller do not disappear these ratings are aggregated by a 
seller over a fairly long period of time and may be based on the seller’s eBay 
performance as either a buyer or a seller.  It does appear that more frequent selling of 
Palm Pilot Vx’s during our sample is consistently indicative of more experience with 
eBay overall and therefore more experience with eBay institutions, such as “Buy it 
Now”.  Thus, in interpreting the selling strategies of less frequent sellers we are inclined 




Figure 1: Mean Seller Rating for Each Group of Sellers in Sample 
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Theoretically, we would expect any negative comments in a seller’s ratings to 
have a significant, detrimental effect on a seller’s eBay reputation and, therefore, a large 
impact on the seller’s choices and the outcomes of these auctions.  However, in the 
correlations presented in Table 4 we found that the ratio of negative comments was not 
highly correlated with either sellers’ choices or the conduct/outcomes of their auctions, 
for the sample as a whole.  In looking a little more closely at eBay’s policy of retaining 
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all historical comments on sellers the preliminary conclusion that this is due to negative 
comments being effectively buried on a separate seller’s feedback page is quite intuitive.   
 
However, in looking more closely at this possibility in the following figure, it 
seems that negative comments would not truly appear to be easily buried until one 
achieves “retailer” status in frequency of selling.  This would require high volume selling 
indeed, as our two retailers sold single Palm Pilot Vx’s in 100 and 161 auctions, 
respectively, within our one-month sample period.  No other seller held more than 33 
auctions for Palm Pilot Vx’s on eBay during the same period.  Therefore, we suspect that 
the problem with seller choices and auction conduct outcomes not being highly correlated 
with the ratio of negative comments is jointly due to negative comments being buried for 
our two retailers and these two sellers holding more than 25% of the auctions that 
resulted in a sale in our sample.  We will look at auctions that did not result in a sale in 
the following section. 
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Since the correlations in Table 4 may not clearly indicate the actual effect of the 
proportion of negative comments in a seller’s rating on seller choices, we want to 
compare plots of mean values of variables that indicate seller choices across these same 
selling frequency groups.  The following figure does this for seller choices involving 
whether or not to protect a seller’s price, either through a public reserve price (posted 
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Again, merely starting the auction with “Buy it Now” is not really protecting a 
price, but it does probably indicate that the seller has some idea of what the equilibrium 
price should be, which leads us to expect ‘Buy it Now’ offers to be more prevalent 
amongst more frequent sellers.  The mean proportion of auctions that start with “Buy it 
Now” first increasing with selling frequency and then decreasing for the next most 
frequent seller group, before reaching the common value of 100 % for our two retailers 
makes the interpretation of less frequent sellers being caught in our cross-sectional 
“snapshot” while in a process of experimentation seem appealing.  That is, making ‘Buy 
it Now’ offers does not monotonically increase with the volume of sales in our sample, 
which would indicate increasing impatience by sellers that are using eBay to move a 
higher volume of product.  We see less experienced sellers using ‘Buy it Now’ in 
different proportions and the proportion cannot be predicted by the frequency of selling 
in our sample. 
 
Protecting a price with either a private reserve price or by posting a price is not a 
favored strategy by either of our retailers but the proportion of these choices is also not 
monotonically decreasing with increased selling frequency for our less-frequent sellers.  
Therefore, these choices do not seem to be predictably tied to the volume of sales by each 
seller in our sample.   
 
Of course, these separate choices are often combined in different ways by the 
different sellers in our study.  Single sellers appear to be the most willing to protect their 
price with a private reserve price but this strategy that risks limiting the number of bids 
and bidders for the assurance that the item will not sell for less is still pretty popular, on 
average, with frequent sellers.  Also, note that posting a price, as we have defined it, 
requires that the auction start with ‘Buy it Now’ so the popularity of this choice among 
the different groups of sellers moves with the popularity of making a ‘Buy it Now’ offer 
to begin with.  Still, neither choice is monotonic with increased selling frequency. 
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The last method of protecting a price is to simply set a higher starting price, with 
the tradeoff between attracting less bidders and bids vs. forcing bids to higher levels 
earlier in the bidding process.  This seller choice is depicted in the following figure along 
with the corresponding sales price.  Again, our two retailers chose to start their auctions 
with an average starting price of $0.01 and did not try to protect a price in any other way, 
as mentioned concerning the previous figure.  On average, by group, single sellers started 
with slightly lower prices than multiple sellers but frequent sellers appear to have favored 
even lower starting prices but no group was anywhere near a mean starting price as low 
as our retailers’ were.  
 
Therefore, it does not appear as if our retailers were behaving as market leaders 
during our sample period, although one can see from the plot of winning bids that, on 
average, they did sell their product for a higher price.  The frequent sellers in our sample 
held as many as 20-33 auctions during our sample yet still did not adopt the same 
strategies as our retailers or do as well in the end, on average.  Multiple sellers held as 
many as 10 auctions during our sample period yet their final sales prices were the worst 
of all, on average. 
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The consequences of seller choices on the conduct of their auctions should help 
complete the picture of how their different strategies eventually resulted in the pattern of 
sales prices that we see in the previous figure.  Briefly, single sellers attracted the lowest 
number of bids and unique bidders even though their auctions lasted the longest period of 
time.  We should therefore probably look to considerations other than seller choices, such 
as typical seller and good characteristics, in order to attempt any explanation of how this 
group of sellers still managed to not end up selling for the lowest average price, relative 
to more experienced sellers. 
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Multiple sellers appear to have attracted only slightly more action than single 
sellers, in terms of the mean number of bids and bidders, while frequent sellers were 
substantially better, as a group, at encouraging more excitement surrounding their 
auctions.  Retailers did not attract that many more unique bidders than frequent sellers 
but the bidding appears to have been allowed to carry on for a bit longer, which may help 
explain the slightly higher sales prices that the two retailers received, on average, relative 
to frequent sellers. 
 
Finally, we checked for how the mean quality of the product varied across these 
groups of sellers.  It is apparent from the Figure 6 that selling more frequently meant 
dealing less and less with damaged merchandise.  It also meant offering steadily less 
extras as part of the product package.  It should be noted that sales of new items on eBay 
appear more prevalent with greater selling frequency of the seller except that our 2 
retailers did not deal in new items.  We would like to qualify this with an observation 
made in collecting the data and looking at the auction advertisements for some 
representative auctions in our sample, including those of retailers.  It was apparent that 
retailers were selling new but repackaged items, probably returned items from some other 
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In summary, the common eBay selling strategy of our two retailers does not seem 
to serve as a template for less frequent sellers of the same product to follow, even if those 
sellers did hold a substantial number of auctions during our sample period.  This does not 
appear to be explained by any one characteristic of the sellers themselves, including their 
reputations, nor does it appear to be only due to differences in product characteristics.  
This pattern of choices appears to be at least partially a combination of these observable 
characteristics with different levels of experience amongst the sellers in our sample, some 
of whom we may have caught in our “snapshot” of the eBay selling process while still in 
a process of experimentation with the various eBay institutions.   
 
In our sample, retailers sell repackaged items with no extras for higher prices, on 
average, than any of the other sellers, conditional upon selling frequency.  Retailers 
accomplish this by letting the auction bidding process run with minimal imposition of 
restrictions by themselves, while still providing an impatient buyer with the opportunity 
to purchase the item immediately at a ‘Buy it Now’ price.   
 
Frequent sellers sell a greater proportion of new items (according to our strict 
definitions) with more extras than retailers but for slightly lower prices, on average.  This 
is apparently due to this group of sellers imposing more restrictions on their auctions than 
retailers in apparent attempts to protect target sales prices, through use of higher starting 
prices, posted prices, and private reserve prices.  It is reasonable to suspect from this 
evidence that this may be an attempt to compensate for the highest mean ratio of negative 
comments, amongst any of the groups of sellers as we have classified them according to 
selling frequency. 
 
Multiple sellers sold, on average, proportionally less new product, with more 
damaged items but also more extras, than frequent sellers.  This combination of mean 
product characteristics together with the highest mean starting price amongst any of these 
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four groups of sellers could alone explain why this group sold its product for the lowest 
mean price, relative to the other groups of sellers, differentiated according to selling 
frequency.  Additionally, the reader should also recognize that these multiple sellers, as a 
group, made noteworthy attempts to protect a price through both private reserve and 
posted prices, as well as having to make choices to best overcome a fairly large ratio of 
negative comments in their seller ratings. 
 
Overall, single sellers in our sample appear to have benefited from having sold 
very little on eBay in the past, although their strategies would appear to be far from 
optimal, also possibly due to this lack of experience with eBay institutions.  Naturally, 
these sellers had the lowest mean seller rating, as a group, relative to the more 
experienced sellers but they also had a mean ratio of negative comments that was the 
lowest of all groups of sellers, outside of our two retailers.  Thus, although this group 
sold the most damaged items and the fewest new items (although with the most inclusion 
of extras), proportionally, and protected their prices substantially with very high starting 
prices, some posting of prices, and the highest proportion of auctions with private reserve 
prices, they still managed to obtain substantially higher sales prices than the next most 
experienced group of sellers, on average. 
 
To conclude this section, although it may appear as if the correlations in Table 4 
indicate that negative comments on eBay are not highly correlated with seller choices, the 
conduct of their auctions, or the final sales price, except for the sellers that start their 
auctions with ‘Buy it Now,’ sellers may simply have effectively covered for that critical 
seller characteristic with a combination of many choices that are possible on eBay.   
While it is true that negative comments can be easily buried on a seller’s ratings page, 
separate from the page that advertises the auction, this cannot easily occur without very 
frequent selling on eBay, on par with over 100 auctions in roughly a one-month period.   
 
The apparent lack of correlation may be due to single sellers making a 
combination of choices that basically undoes the advantage of having very few negative 
comments (although they also do not have many positive comments either), while more 
frequent sellers employ a mix of auction characteristics and selling strategies to overcome 
temporarily poor reputations.  This “active management” may weaken the correlations 
between any one seller choice or aspect of auction conduct and the seller’s reputation.  
On the bottom line, some seller groups, categorized according to seller frequency, have 
done slightly worse than others but there appears to be a much wider dispersion in seller 
choices than in the mean final sales price, conditional on selling frequency.  
 
 
6. Sale Probabilities and Seller Characteristics and Choices  
 
In this section, we consider the sample of 1177 auctions for which we had 
complete data, including 169 auctions that did not result in a sale. Table 5 shows that 
there were some systematic differences between auctions that resulted in a sale and those 
that did not. In particular, potential sellers who used a private reserve price were much 
more likely to fail to sell the item.  However, it is possible that the same sellers re-entered 
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our sample by re-listing without a private reserve. This is consistent with the higher 
proportion of sellers without a sale having conducted 2-10 auctions. 
 
More than half the sellers chose to not make a ‘Buy it Now’ option available, 
whether or not these auctions eventually ended in a sale.  However, a higher proportion 
of the auctions that did end in a sale had this option available to start the auction.  Sellers 
in our sample rarely chose to use “Buy it Now” to effectively post a price, but when they 
did, the result was always a sale.  This is an important sub-sample in our regression 
analysis of the companion paper to this one, where an auction and was not actually taking 
place. 
 
Also, it is important to note that the mean number of unique negative comments 
about the seller, conditional upon having made the sale, is slightly larger than for the 
auctions without a sale.  This may be partly because of how such negative comments are 
collected and listed.
7 Furthermore, negative comments may simply be outweighed by 
positive comments, or by seller choices with respect to the auction parameters.  
 
 
Table 5: Differences Between Auctions that Resulted in a Sale or Not 
 
Selected Seller Choices and Characteristics “Sale”  “No  Sale” 
Seller had a Private Reserve Price  0.183  0.562 
Seller Chose to Make a ‘Buy it Now’ Option Available  0.471  0.302 
Seller Chose to use “Buy it Now” to Effectively Post a Price  0.090  0 
Seller only Held 1 Auction During the Sample period  0.316  0.396 
Seller Held 2-10 Auctions During the Sample Period  0.216  0.450 
Seller Held 10-50 Auctions During the Sample Period  0.208  0.130 
Seller Held over 50 Auctions During the Sample Period  0.259  0.024 
Number of Unique Negative Comments on Seller  2.77  2.04 
Number of Unique Positive Comments on Seller  230  116 
Seller Rating  228  115 
Sample Size  1008  169 
 
 
We collected the data used to measure seller reputations after the auctions were 
completed.  Additionally, in our data, the seller’s measured reputation is affected by any 
comments that he received from other sellers, where he was a buyer, either during or 
before our sample period.  One can see from Table 5 that about 85% of the sellers who 
held auctions that did not result in a sale were “less-frequent” sellers (held less than 10 
                                                 
7First of all, only the seller rating appears on the primary auction page as part of the most vital, summary 
information that the potential buyer views first.  In order to view the amount and type of negative 
comments, which a seller accrues only from previous buyers, who actually purchased an item from him, or 
from previous sellers, who actually sold an item to him, the buyer must click on a link to a secondary 
“feedback” page and potentially scroll through hundreds of comments on frequent sellers in order to obtain 
full information on any negative comments.  Secondly, previous bidders for this seller's goods, who did not 
win the auction, are unable to contribute to the seller's official feedback.  Thus, eBay protects the sellers 
from the repercussion of actual and potential negative feedback in these two ways, with the second eBay 
policy probably being the most important. 
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auctions during our sample period).  If we are willing to accept this as an indicator that 
these same sellers have completed fewer overall transactions on eBay then it is intuitive 
to expect both fewer positive and fewer negative comments concerning sellers in this “no 
sale” sub-sample.   
 
Conversely, in the “sale” portion of the sample (which we consider in more detail 
in a complementary paper – Anderson et al., 2004), the proportion of more experienced 
sellers is much greater.  The evidence in Table 5 for the mean seller rating, the number of 
unique positive comments, and the number of unique negative comments are being 
higher for our eventual sample is consistent with the relatively higher proportion of more 
frequent sellers.  This evidence causes us to expect that the seller rating and other 
measures of seller reputation may not be very highly correlated with the outcomes of 
these auctions for the sample as a whole, since eBay has no term of expiration for old 
feedback and all feedback for a registered member is lumped together, whether they were 
a buyer or a seller in the previously completed transaction.   
 
 
Table 6:  Numbers of Auctions Resulting in a Sale with Use of Private Reserve 
 
No Private Reserve Private Reserve  Total 
Auction Resulted in No Sale  74 95  169 
Auction Resulted in Sale  824 184  1008 
Total  898 279  1177 
 
 
In Table 6, we re-examine conditional means, and look more closely at the 
“number of sales” in private reserve auctions.  The proportion of auctions where the 
seller did not set a private reserve price that resulted in no sale is only 74/898 = 0.082, 
while the proportion of these non-private reserve auctions that resulted in a sale 0.918.  
Additionally, the proportion of private reserve auctions that resulted in “no sale” is 
95/279 = 0.341, leaving a proportion of 0.659 private reserve auctions that did result in a 
sale.  Thus, these probabilities of completing a sale, conditional upon the seller’s choice 
of whether or not to hold a private reserve auction, appear to favor not having a private 
reserve price in our sample, although eBay allows sellers to make this choice.  A possible 
rationale for sellers lies in the fact that successful private reserve auctions resulted in 





An important aspect of our analysis is the specific strategy that appears to be 
adopted by the highest volume sellers, whom we have termed ‘retailers’.  What we 
observe is (i) seller ratings are higher for retailers than for the rest of the sample, which 
follows from our discussion of how eBay’s seller ratings favor more frequent sellers;  (ii) 
both of the retailers in our sample started their auctions by making a ‘Buy it Now’ option 
available but they did not set the starting price to equal the ‘Buy it Now’ price (i.e., they 
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did not post a price);  (iii) retailers did not rely on a private reserve price to protect their 
‘Buy it Now’ price and the prices that they selected for minimum bids (starting prices) 
were all the lowest possible ($0.01), which can potentially encourage a larger volume of 
bidding.  Basically, all retailers in our sample took full advantage of the hybrid, ‘Buy it 
Now’ institution by using it to provide a quick sale to impatient buyers, yet encouraging 
as much bidding up of the price as possible if no impatient buyer happened to be 
shopping at the time.  This retailer strategy illustrates the appeal and potential optimality 
of ‘Buy it Now’ for larger volume sellers on eBay.  
 
Since we only captured the strategies of two retailers in our cross-section, it is 
interesting to look for patterns in the strategies of the other sellers that entered and exited 
this market during our brief sample period.  The most prominent conclusion from this 
data is that the market included a large number of “new” sellers, with heterogeneous 
characteristics who tried a wide range of strategies.  In particular, these sellers did not 
follow the strategies of retailers, even if they possessed similar characteristics (such as 
having a high seller rating), and the product that they were selling was also similar to 
those being sold by retailers (for example, being new).  We did find that more highly 
rated sellers were somewhat more likely to provide more detailed product information, as 
well as secure payment options 
 
A primary difference between sellers was the volume of sales during the sample 
period. There was not a monotonic convergence toward the “retailer strategy” for more 
frequent sellers, though some patterns of convergence did emerge in reputation and in the 
number of bids.  Our analysis of sellers on eBay is suggestive of a conclusion that it is 
not a straightforward exercise for new sellers to identify and copy successful strategies, in 
particular those of retailers. It is also possible that some lower volume sellers were 
experimenting with different selling strategies during our sample period.  Future work 
may be able to explore the possibility that information technology accelerates processes 
of evolution of strategies in markets. On the other hand, high turnover and heterogeneity 
among sellers on eBay will continue to make convergence of strategies difficult.   
 
Finally, our analysis of unsuccessful auctions clearly illustrated the importance of 
a private reserve price, leading to a trade-off between selling price and probability of sale.  
Future work that is more concerned with the dynamics surrounding experimentation and 
re-entry can build upon our observations here, and attempt to follow sellers who failed to 
sell, in order to determine how their strategies evolve in future attempts. 
  25Anderson, Friedman, Milam and Singh, eBay Sellers, April 2004 
References 
 
Anderson, S., Friedman, D., Milam, G., and N. Singh, 2004, “Buy it Now: A Hybrid 
Market Institution,” UCSC Working Paper, April. 
 
Ariely, Dan, Axel Ockenfels and Alvin E. Roth (2003), An Experimental Analysis of 
Ending Rules in Internet Auctions, CESIFO Working Paper 987, July. 
 
Bajari, P. and A. Hortaçsu (2003), The Winner’s Curse, Reserve Prices and Endogenous 
Entry: Empirical Insights from eBay Auctions, Rand Journal of Economics, 34, 2, 
329-355. 
 
Hof, Robert D. (2003) The eBay Economy, Business Week, August 25, 2003, 
http://www.businessweek.com:/print/magazine/content/03_34/b3846650.htm?mz 
 
Houser, Daniel, and John Wooders, (2000), “Reputation in Auctions: Theory, and 
Evidence from eBay,” http://bpa.arizona.edu/~jwooders/ebay.pdf 
 
Katkar, R. and Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000). Public Versus Secret Reserve Prices in eBay 
Auctions: Results from a Pokemon Field Experiment. Vanderbilt University Working 
Paper. 
 
Lucking-Reiley, D. (1999). Using Field Experiments to Test Equivalence Between 
Auction Formats: Magic on the Internet. American Economic Review (89):1063-1080. 
 
Lucking-Reiley, D., Bryan, D., Prasad, N., and Reeves, D. (2000). Pennies from eBay: 
The Determinants of Price in Online Auctions. Vanderbilt University Working Paper. 
 
McAfee, R. Preston and Daniel Vincent, (1993), "The Declining Price Anomaly" Journal 
of Economic Theory, (60) 191-212. 
 
Milam, Garrett (2002) “Market Institutions and Performance: Theory and Evidence,” 
June, PhD Dissertation, UC Santa Cruz. 
 
Morgan, John and Michael R. Baye, (2001), "Information Gatekeepers on the Internet 
and the Competitiveness of Homogeneous Product Markets," American Economic 
Review, 91, 454-74 
 
Ockenfels, Alex and Alvin Roth, (2004), “Late and Multiple Bidding in Second Price 
Internet Auctions: Theory and Evidence Concerning Different Rules for Ending an 
Auction,” Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. 
 
Peters, Michael and Sergei Severinov, (2002), "Internet Auctions with Many Traders" 
University of Toronto Working Paper, 
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/peters/papers/reserve_prices_4.pdf  
 
  26Anderson, Friedman, Milam and Singh, eBay Sellers, April 2004 
  27
Resnick, Paul, Richard Zeckhauser, John Swanson, and Kate Lockwood, (2003), “The 
Value of Reputation on eBay: A Controlled Experiment,” 
http://www.si.umich.edu/~presnick/papers/postcards/.  
 
Riley, John and William F Samuelson, (1981),  "Optimal Auctions," American Economic 
Review, 71 381-392. 
 
Roth, Alvin E. and Axel Ockenfels (2002) “Last-Minute Bidding and the Rules for 
Ending Second-Price Auctions: Evidence from eBay and Amazon Auctions on the 
Internet”, American Economic Review, 92, 4, 1093-1103. 
 